From the PIN Steering Committee

The goals of the PIN Group are the widest-possible dissemination of new information about negotiation, the development of networks of scholars and practitioners who are interested in the subject, and, more generally, the improved study and practice of negotiation at the international level. These goals are being achieved repeatedly in the work of the PIN Program, as many items in this issue of PINPoints will testify.

The international conference, organized by the French PIN network and scheduled to take place in Paris from 11–12 December 2003, has attracted more than 50 international scholars to present research papers. Many more are coming to listen. PIN members and their colleagues are active presenters at international conferences such as those of the International Studies Association and the International Association for Conflict Management. The book that we have published every year of the Program’s existence reaches a large international audience. We have held road shows around the world. As we return from Tehran and Mannheim this year, we prepare for our visits to the University for Peace (UPAZ) in Costa Rica and to Cairo University next year. As a result of the Tehran meetings, the Group is looking at conducting support activities for dialogue among the five riparian states of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, one of the forthcoming PIN books analyzes (for the first time, oddly enough) the European Union as a negotiation process.

On a wider front, six major conflicts in Africa are on the path to resolution as a result of international negotiations. This is, of course, a sign of the times rather than a direct result of PIN activity. On the other hand, the leading nations of the world, the members of

(continued on page 2)
turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances), that do wrong.

*The Holy Quran*, al-Mumtahanah [She that is to be examined], Sura LX: 8-9

**Legitimacy and Types of Negotiations**

In view of their peaceful nature, negotiations are more beneficial than violence and terror. Violence is a coercive procedure and its effect is temporary. Negotiating, on the other hand, is constructive and stabilizing; it has a lasting effect because it depends on the elements of rational persuasion and mutual respect, on the observation of the principle of equality, the endorsement of friendship and understanding, and the rejection of discord and struggle. Thus, the benefits of negotiation are immediate and come swiftly; moreover, the Almighty proclaimed that compulsion on religion grounds was forbidden and undesirable:

2:256 Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in God hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And God heareth and knoweth all things.

*The Holy Quran*, Taubah [Repentance], Sura II: 256

We find other signs and indications of the legitimacy of negotiations in the Holy Quran from the verses of the time-honored Madani legislation, as in this statement of the Almighty:

9:6 If one amongst the Pagans ask thee for asylum, grant it to him, so that he may hear the word of God; and then escort him to where he can be secure. That is because they are men without knowledge.

*The Holy Quran*, Taubah [Repentance], Sura IX: 6

In his interpretation of this verse, Ibn-Kather says, “The purpose (of the verse) is that he who came from Dar al-Harb (the land of war) to Dar al-Islam (the land of submission) to perform a mission or commerce, or to request reconciliation or a truce, or to carry a jiziah (tax taken from non-Muslims), or for other such reasons, and requested from the Imam or his deputy safety, be given safety for as long as he is visiting Dar al-Islam and until he goes back to his home and country.” Al-Qurtobi says: “This is correct. The pagans asked to meet the Prophet Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, in order to talk about reconciliation and their other worldly interests. This all happened through the channels of negotiation.”

The statement of God Almighty also endorses negotiation:

8:61 But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God: for He is One that heareth and knoweth all things.

*The Holy Quran*, Anfal [The Spoils of War], Sura VIII: 61

because there is no path to an understanding on peace, to the adoption of

the United Nations Security Council, are struggling to find the appropriate negotiatory behaviors for dealing with staggering problems such as Iraq, nuclear proliferation, and climate change. We could go on and on, underlining the importance of negotiation today, as we often do in these editorials.

Yet, it is through individual efforts that progress is being made in the academic field and among practitioners.

In the academic world, there are very few programs for the study and analysis of negotiation and, more broadly, of conflict management/resolution. Most of those that do exist are located in the United States and, even there, they are not many. Mainstream international relations theory deftly skirts round negotiation; social psychology, after a period of active attention, passes beyond it; economics does not know how to handle it. Circularly, as both a cause and an effect, foundations pay extraordinarily little attention to negotiation. The Hewlett Foundation, which has graciously underwritten the PIN Program for some years since the Carnegie Corporation ended its sponsorship, has been unique in its support of the subject but is now reorganizing the funding of its Conflict Management Program. The important Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, led by Dr David Hamburg, constituted a much-needed and productive program, but its brief term is over. The US Institute of Peace is a lone institution in the field with a broad mission and limited means.

MacArthur recently gave large grants to a series of American universities for security studies; military studies have never lacked for funds. It is reported that the Ford Foundation has established a new Conflict Management Program. It is about time—and we await news of the content with interest.

This is not a plaintive cry of self-interest; the PIN Program has been able to use the financial support it has received both frugally and productively, and we look forward to its continuation on our record. Rather, it is a call for attention to the larger field and its needs—an alert addressed to the program managers of the large foundations to start planning support for research and institution-building within universities and other teaching and research organizations; to assist them in developing and disseminating more and better information about an activity that is widely practiced in our daily lives and badly needed in the conflict-ridden world of today. In a world where national leaders are trained in well-supported theories of International Relations Realism, a new surge of program building is needed for teaching, studying, disseminating, and improving the process of negotiation and conflict management.

PIN is doing well, thank you, but we would like some company please.

Rudolf Avenhaus
Franz Cede
Guy Olivier Faure
Victor Kremenjak
Paul Meerts
Gunnar Sjöstedt
I. William Zartman
peace and to the granting of peace, except through negotiation. The verse on the legitimacy of neutrality also endorses this practice, and it is the statement of God Almighty:

4:90 Accept those who join a group between whom and you there is a treaty (of peace), or those who approach you with hearts restraining them from fighting you as well as fighting their own people. If God had pleased, He could have given them power over you, and they would have fought you: Therefore if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and (instead) send you (guarantees of) peace, then God Hath opened no way for you (to war against them).


The Prophet Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, entered into many negotiations with the pagans in Mecca and in Medina, before the outbreak of fighting and afterwards, and this demonstrates the legitimacy of negotiating.

One example is the negotiation by the Prophet Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, with the Jews of Bani al-Nuzair in and around Medina over blood money for two men accidentally killed by a Muslim.

Another is the negotiation by the Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, during the Hudabiah Reconciliation, with the envoy of Quraish, Suhail ibn Ummr.

Another is the negotiation, with Abi Sufian, the leader of Quraish, to end the fighting during the conquest of Mecca. Abi Sufian said: “O messenger of God, the best warriors of Quraish have been wiped out; there is no Quraish after this day.” The Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, replied: “He who shuts his door is safe, and who enters the home of Abi Sufian is safe.” So the people shut their doors.

Still another example is the negotiation by Prophet Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, with Bodail bin Warqa al-Khozaee, from the people of Tehama in Southwest Arabia, who informed the Prophet about the preparation of Quraish to fight prior to the Hudabiah Reconciliation. The Messenger of God, Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, said: “We did not come to fight anyone, but we came as pilgrims to perform Omrah (the minor pilgrimage to Mecca). The war has exhausted Quraish and harmed them. If they wish, I will make peace with them for a time, provided they allow me and the people to perform Omrah…”

The Objectives of Negotiation

Among the most important objectives of negotiation is to spread the Islamic call. For example, during the hajj season before his Hegira to Medina, the Prophet negotiated with six Kazraj Arabs from one of two major Arab tribes inhabiting Medina, calling them to Islam to help him deliver the message of his God. The following year, the Prophet concluded the First Aqaba Pledge of allegiance with 12 men, 10 of whom came from the Kazraj and 2 from the Oss, the second major Arab tribe in Medina. The following year, the Second Aqaba pledge of allegiance included 73 men, among them 62 from the Kazraj and 11 from the Oss.

Other objectives of negotiation include the settlement of an armed conflict, ending an ongoing war, exchanging prisoners of war or ransom- ing them, as occurred on the first military encounter between the Muslims and the pagans from Mecca during the Great Bader Battle in the second year after Hegira. In that battle, an agreement was reached to ransom prisoners of war for 4,000 dirhams each; anyone who did not have ransom, but was proficient in reading and writing, was assigned 10 boys from Medina to teach; and that was his ransom. This was repeated in the wars of the Muslims against the Persians during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and with the Byzantines during the era of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs. In 245 A.H. (A.D. 860), Mikhail bin Tufeel asked for negotiations to implement peace between the Byzantine state and the Abbasid state so that there could be a prisoner-of-war exchange between them.

Negotiating can be used to ward off danger from the Islamic lands; it can include the payment of money from Muslims to others, as happened during the negotiations and treaty of reconciliation between the Muslims and the Byzantines during the reign of Mo’awiah. Negotiating can also be used to endorse good neighborly relations, or to stimulate trade and commerce, and other vital interests between the Muslims and others. This actually happened between the Islamic state and the Byzantine state of eastern Europe, the greatest European power of the Middle Ages. Negotiating and pledging for the purposes of neighbourliness, friendship, commerce, or any other objective to implement peace and trade benefits, was frequent during the different Islamic epochs.

Among the examples of negotiations and diplomatic activity was the dispatch by three of the most powerful Abbasid caliphs—Abu Jaafar al-Mansoor, al-Mahdi bin al-Mansoor, and Haroon al-Rashid bin al-Mahdi—of delegates to negotiate with court of the Franks to reinforce the alliance between the Abbasids and the Franks so that the Umayyad emirate in Andalusia would remain in constant fear of the threat of the Franks on its margins. As the negotiations and diplomatic activity between the Abbasids and the Franks reached their peak, and exchanges of precious gifts took place between Haroon al-Rashid and Emperor Charlemagne, political relations between the Abbasids and the Franks were strengthened.

On the other side of the coin, the strengthening of relations between the Franks and the Abbasids caused a reaction on the part of the Byzantines, who feared further Frankish influence in Christendom, particularly after Caliph Haroon al-Rashid sent the keys of the Church of the Resurrection in Jerusalem to Charlemagne. As a result, the Byzantines turned to the Emirate of the Umayyads in Andalusia and increased their negotiating activity and diplomacy to foster the harmony of interests on western Europe between the Byzantines and the Andalusian Umayyads. Negotiating missions came from Constantinople to Cordoba, the capital
of Andalusia, and the political relations between these two capitals reached their zenith during the reign of Emperor Constantine VII and the Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Rahman al-Nasser.

In most cases, negotiations take place to request the conclusion of a reconciliation agreement or a truce, and an end to the state of tension between nations, as happened during the negotiations to conclude the Hudabiah Reconciliation in the sixth year after Hegira. The Quraish sent a man called Suhail ibn Ummr to engage in a dialogue with Muhammad on reconciliation. When he arrived, he said: “O Muhammad, what has happened was not the verdict of our wise men, but something that was carried out by the foolish among us. So release to us those whom you have taken prisoners.” The Prophet Muhammad said: “Not until you release those whom you have with you.” Then they released Ottoman and the 10 men who were with him, and Suhail said to the Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him: “Let me write a treaty between us and you.” When the Prophet saw it, he said: “God has facilitated your affair.”

The objectives of Islamic negotiation multiplied and achieved numerous aims, among them consolidation of political, cultural, scientific, and social ties. Thus, during the Abbasid era, the Muslims sent negotiators to the capitals of Europe to end a state of war, conclude a commercial or a cultural alliance, and other similar matters. Negotiations pertaining to ending a state of war or settling conflicts took top priority in diplomatic relations between the Islamic state and European powers. The cultural negotiations of ambassadors had numerous objectives; for example, to request rare books, and to study historical sites relating to occurrences in the Islamic state or events mentioned in the Holy Quran. One example is the mission of the Abbasid Caliph al-Wathiq (A.D 842–847) to Ephesus in Asia Minor to visit the graves of Ahl al-Kahf (the People of the Cave) who died as martyrs during the days of Emperor Dakaldyanos and were mentioned in the Holy Quran in Sura al-Kahf (Sura XVIII).

In the modern age, as regional states emerged, negotiations assumed the new role of settling conflict on borders or in certain areas, such as islands, whether between Muslims and other Muslims or between Muslims and others, for example, the border problems between Iraq and Iran, between Qatar and Bahrain, and between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Negotiations perform an important role in many scientific and military fields, such as obtaining expertise, buying weapons or manufacturing them, and acquiring atomic know-how for peaceful or military purposes.

**Fundamentals of Negotiating**

The success of the negotiations depends on the commitment of the two sides, both Muslim and non-Muslim, to the fundamental rules governing the conduct of the negotiations. Agreement is usually reached in advance concerning these fundamental rules and conditions, and dialogue proceeds from there. The two sides will take cognizance of these fundamentals only if they have good intentions. Diplomatic customs and traditions have been such that the two sides first exchange letters and messages until they reach an agreement on the practicalities of ending the conflict. These letters or messages are drafted in an amicable style that seeks to remove whatever malice and hatred there might be on either side. Negotiations begin with the expression of viewpoints, presentation of arguments and evidence in support of one’s own case, and a reminder to the other side of the principles of negotiation that were agreed upon. During negotiations, the Muslim side must pay as much attention to the Islamic interest as possible when agreeing on issues, in line with the instructions of the Imam to negotiators. One of the important factors of successful negotiation is the observance of the principle of flexibility during negotiations to bring points of view closer, end the conflict, stabilize security and peace, and replace dispute and conflict with cordiality and understanding.

An excellent example of the flexibility of Muslims during negotiations came during the Hudabiah Reconciliation. The Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, called for Suhail ibn Ummr, the man sent by the Quraish to negotiate the peace treaty, and instructed him to write at the top of the page of the treaty, “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.” Suhail, however, objected, saying, “As for ‘the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful,’ I do not know God by that name. Let us write (instead), ‘In thy name, O Allah’.” The Muslims said: “By God! We will not write this; we will write only, ‘In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful’.” But the Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, instructed Suhail to write, “In thy name, O Allah.” Then Muhammad continued, “This is what Muhammad, the Messenger of God, agreed to.” But Suhail said: “I don’t believe that you are the Messenger of Allah. If I did, I would not have kept you away from the Kaaba and I would not have fought you. So, write ‘Muhammad, the son of Abd Allah.’” The Prophet, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, replied: “By God! I am the Messenger of God, even if you have accused me of lying.” The Prophet, however, agreed that he should be referred to in the treaty as “Muhammad, son of Abd Allah.” The Muslims were very upset at this, and one of them cried out, “Are you not Allah’s Messenger, and are we not Muslims? How can we accept such treatment when we are right and they are wrong?” But the Prophet knew what was best and the Treaty of Hudabiah was signed.

These are the important features of negotiations in Islam and if they demonstrate anything, it is the pre-eminence of Islamic thought and diplomacy and that Islamic negotiations do not differ in their procedures and results from modern principles of negotiations. They also demonstrate that where an important aim is in view, Muslims are credible and high-principled, disciplined, ambitious in their objectives, and superior in both their intentions and their resolve.

*Translation by Turki al-Tamimi.*

*Translations from The Holy Quran by Abdullah Yusuf Ali*
Negotiating European Integration

The European Union (EU) is one enormous negotiation process. What is this process about today? And will it be about in the years to come, once the EU has deepened and widened?

The EU started off as a confidence-building mechanism between the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Both countries wanted to prevent another war in Europe by making an economic arrangement that would create a stable and secure situation with economic benefits as a spin-off. Thus, in 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community was established; but France and Germany needed some neutral partners to help them forge a long-lasting stability. So Italy and the Benelux countries stepped into the process.

Ever since, this multilateral framework for international negotiations has been expanding: within the economic realm (first pillar), into the security and foreign policy dimension (second pillar), and in the arena of justice and home affairs (third pillar). Apart from widening its number of new areas of concern, however, the EU has also enlarged its membership. It is broadening in two ways: by increasing the number of policy areas and the number of partners to be integrated.

New countries have entered the ring in several waves: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (1973); Greece (1981); Portugal and Spain (1986); and Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995). The Fifteen have now decided to accept 10 new members in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania may join in 2007, and Croatia may well be slotted in before that. Turkey will have to wait, let’s speculate, until 2015. By that date, countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia will also be serious candidates—and Norway and Switzerland, too: it’s up to them. The EU may end up in the first quarter of the 21st century with some 35 states, sharing borders with the non-member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Israel, of course, though some commentators see that country as a future member of the European Union.

The EU is not only broadening its horizons, but also deepening its cooperation. It is doing this in two ways: by covering more and more aspects of the substantive areas that it views as its own domain and by strengthening the EU institutions. The supranational elements, such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, are being beefed up, as are the intergovernmental bodies, such as the European Council of Heads of States and Government Leaders, the Council of Ministers, and the whole range of working groups and committees served by negotiators from the public and—to a far lesser extent—the private sector.

Member states organize themselves into coalitions. Stable coalitions can be seen along North–South lines (rich and poor, but mainly the Germanic versus Latin cultures). There is also a supranational–intergovernmental axis, Atlanticism versus Continentalism, free traders versus protectionists, big countries and small countries, and so on. All these groupings are cross-cutting: one country is always part of more than one “structural” alliance and, in addition to this, there are countless different coalitions on different issues. The effect of these coalition patterns is twofold: they both slow down and stabilize EU negotiation processes. The EU may well be a negotiation arena that secures both European and national interests, but it does not enhance the strength of the Union as a global actor. The Union is (still) no match for the United States, which is capable of breaking up EU consensus on vital world questions such as the war against terrorism, the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and the intervention against Iraq. The European Union is, as a negotiated framework, both powerful and vulnerable, united and disunited, a fortress and a free-for-all.

The present negotiation process can be characterized as an international multilateral process based on multilateral intranational negotiations. The international multilateral process, however, has been affected by two other dimensions, the first being the drive for supranationalism and the other being national or intranational policy making.

From the very beginning, the member states realized that a workable EU would be impossible without at least a partial transfer of sovereignty to supranational bodies, in the first instance, the Commission. The effect is that EU negotiation processes cannot be seen as purely international. If we define an international negotiation process as something that cannot really be controlled because the world lacks a strong third party to make a decision if international negotiations fail—and here we apologize to the United Nations and, in particular, to the Security Council and the International Court of Justice—then, at least parts of the EU negotiation processes cannot be called international. Where the Commission has a strong role to play and states can decide by qualified majority voting (mainly in the first pillar and partly in the third pillar)—though they will always try to reach consensus first—a distinct negotiation process comes into being, which we can label “supranational negotiation.” The difference between international and supranational negotiations, then, is a difference in control. As national negotiations are very much controlled by national governments, international negotiations have more of a free-for-all character and supranational negotiations are an in-between hybrid. In terms of the negotiation process, it has been observed that supranational negotiations are more intense (because of the threat to be outvoted) than their international counterpart.

This drive toward supranationalism, in other words the creation of a strong negotiating framework to enhance the effectiveness of international negotiations, is not a new development. After the fall of the Roman Empire, whose former borders are still at the root of the cultural rift between the EU countries of the North and South—expressing itself, inter alia, in the usage of French and English in EU plenary sessions—the Europeans tried to replace the Roman order by a hierarchical framework of sovereign states. This structure decayed during the Middle Ages and came to an end in the middle of the 17th century at the Peace Conference of Westphalia (1648).

Countries then tried to keep the balance in a system of sovereign states that were formally equal, although some, of course, were far more equal than others. Stability was constantly threatened by the use of force, with international negotiation becoming a tool in warfare. States
Vienna at the beginning of the 19th century was multilateral only in the sense that more than two or three countries participated. The negotiations remained parallel bilateral. It was only at the Congress of Vienna that real multilateral negotiations could be observed. At the beginning of the 20th century, this multilateralism was institutionalized in the League of Nations and, later, in the United Nations. For genuine, peaceful cooperation and integration, however, this proved to be inadequate. Consequently, supranationalism was introduced as the highest stage of stable negotiation processes between states.

Does this mean that supranational negotiation will be the dominant negotiation mode in the EU at the end of the 21st century? There are no signs of this. Intergovernmentalism is on the rise again and, as a result, is international negotiation in its multilateral and bilateral format. Why is this? On the one hand, it has to do with the cyclical character of EU processes. Times of further integration are balanced by times of national reaction, followed by more internationalization and supranationalization. But it also has to do with the character of the negotiation processes themselves. The more actors and the more issues, the more complex the multilateral process. Supranational negotiations are part of the solution for rising complexity, the other part being intergovernmental bilateral and trilateral negotiations, including lobbying. The negotiation process cannot be managed inside the multilateral mode as much as it could in the past (though many of the most important decisions in the EU have undoubtedly been “pre-cooked” in small caucuses). The result is a process around the process, making things more manageable perhaps, but increasing opacity and frustrating concerted cooperation. The growth of centered negotiation processes in the EU provokes an increase in centrifugal negotiation processes that tend to run in a parallel instead of integrated way. Is this a regression to 17th-century practices? For the time being, we will probably see a mix of supranational and international negotiation processes on the European level, with a growing circus of bilateral and trilateral bargaining.

What then about national negotiations or, better still, intranational negotiation processes? As the EU grows in substance and area, national coordination becomes more and more important and more and more difficult. It becomes more important because decisions taken in Brussels have an ever-growing impact on national policy making. Therefore, ministries will have to set clear priorities and cooperate as effectively as possible. While bigger member states can still relax somewhat in this respect, the smaller states have no time and plenty of power to lose. They are obliged to be as effective as possible in their multilateral intranational negotiations. This is a particular shock for the new member states in Central Europe. They have only 10 years of experience in coordinating negotiations between equal ministries. Before that, the Soviet Union and the communist party took the decisions. Even the old member states themselves are confronted by multiplying coordination problems. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) can hardly cope with the growth of negotiation processes between the specialized ministries at a time when coordination is needed more than ever. Some policy makers have already started to think aloud about the option of decentralizing the tasks of the Foreign Ministries to specialized ministries, adding a foreign affairs coordination unit on to the Office of the Prime Minister, and doing away with the MFA. As one additional argument is that as the bulk of the negotiation processes in the EU deal with national affairs, only second-pillar matters should remain in the foreign affairs domain and the world outside the EU, of course. But as more and more foreign policy making becomes integrated within the EU, the room for independent external policies outside it is also diminishing. What will be the role of the diplomatic negotiator?

We would like to postulate that, because of the deepening of the process, the role of the diplomatic negotiator will be taken over, and actually has been taken over already in many areas, by civil service negotiators, both at the national as well as the supranational and international levels. It has been noticed that there are not enough specialized civil servants to run the negotiation processes in a smooth way. Civil service generalists will have to oversee the job—bureaucrats in diplomats’ clothing, one might argue. Several problems arise here. The linkage between the different substantive areas could be endangered, as this new breed of negotiators will direct their efforts on to their own sector and will not take into account the “packages” between these areas. This might then secure a role—no longer a dominant role as in the 20th century—for the old-fashioned but probably newly styled EU diplomat. He/she will also be needed in the external EU negotiations as far as the second pillar is concerned but will lose out on first and third pillar external relations. While diplomats are trained to overcome cultural and emotional rifts, civil servants may not be so well-versed in such procedures. The consequence could be a less-rational negotiation process within the EU, which is a dangerous development on a continent that has been devastated by religious and ideological wars. More attention is needed to the emotional factor in EU negotiation processes. As it happens, negotiators of the countries of the North have more difficulty in dealing with this than their counterparts from the South where networking is their bread and butter.

We would also like to postulate that not only the deepening but also the broadening of the EU will complicate and change EU negotiation processes, mainly because of the rising number of actors. EU member countries are contemplating more institutionalization and even took some decisions on this in Nice under the French Presidency. This will not, however, lead to a further reduction in national sovereignty or even to greater political maneuverability, and European countries do not like this very much, to say the least. So the process will be slow and, even if it is successful, there will be doubts as to how much more effective the more institutionalized and formal negotiations are over ad hoc and informal ones.

But there is also a question of culture here: systemic, political and bureaucratic, and societal. Systemic, because the variety of political cultures will increase, making matters less comparable and less transparent. The EU already faces differences, such as those between centralized countries (France, Sweden), and decentralized ones (Germany, Belgium). This systemic in-comparability already leads to confusion, behavioral differences between negotiators, and obstacles to effective decision making.
making. Political, because the behavioral differences between the network culture of the South and the process culture of the North will be complicated by the hierarchical cultures in most of the candidate member states. Their political culture has been shaped by centralized democracy, based on a much older layer of autocratic rule under the Austrian Emperors, the Ottoman Sultans, and the Russian Tsars. As “take” seems to make more common sense than “give and take,” the EU might be in for a surprise as far as negotiation processes are concerned. These differences in outlook are strengthened by bureaucratic and societal habits and will profoundly change the negotiations inside and outside Brussels. Trust may be faltering and it will take time to redress this.

Then there is the multiplication of issue areas. New issues will be integrated into the process, more coordination will be needed, and the negotiation process will be complicated further. There is a bright side to this, however. The more issues and the more options, the more likely there are to be integrative instead of distributive negotiating processes.

To summarize, we see an EU negotiation process that will be so complex that it might, in itself, be an obstacle to further integration. At the same time, the possibilities for integrated solutions will be on the rise. The result may be a new balance, where the EU will continue to grow as a system, and a process that will be larger than the sum of its parts. At the same time, there will be important issue areas where the parts will be—and perhaps will become—too large for the common good. This disparity may develop along the lines of the internal and the external position of the EU. Internally, more power and possibilities will be generated. Externally, the EU may remain what it is today, or might even slide back to becoming a coalition that cannot get its act together.

For EU negotiation, this would mean growing interdependency of national, international, and supranational negotiation processes. Politicians and civil servants would dominate the scene; diplomats would lose their hegemony. In the relations between the EU and the outside world, however, the distribution of roles would be more balanced.

Politicians, civil servants, and diplomats would be of equal importance to negotiators. They would have to find a balanced interplay. Power would be less centralized than inside the EU and, while external forces would have little impact on the internal EU negotiation processes, they would be more able to distort the external ones. While, internally, a common negotiation market might be expected, it would probably remain a partial free-for-all in the external sphere, especially as far as common foreign policy and security are concerned.

To conclude, we would like to state that EU negotiation processes will be a sufficient tool in managing the common and diverging interests of the EU countries in the first quarter of the 21st century. After that, they could hamper further integration as long as these processes remain rooted in the intranational negotiations as we know them today. A new format will have to be found then and, yes, the political system of the United States could be the model here, as long as Europe can guard and enhance its own inherent cultural values.

Paul Meerts

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Conference on “The Sources of European Negotiation” Held in Paris

On the initiative of Alain Lempereur, diplomatic scholars and practitioners came together at a conference on the Sources of European Diplomacy, organized by the School of Advanced Economic and Commercial Studies (ESSEC) in Paris from 18–19 June 2003. Among the analysts present were historians (Marc Fumaroli, Bernard Barbiche, Madeleine Hael, Lucien Bély); political scientists (Charles Cogan); lawyers (Alain Lempereur); economists (Christophe Dupont); sociologists (Guy Olivier Faure). Among the practitioners were Alain Planteay, former diplomatic advisor to Général de Gaulle; Hubert Védrine, former French minister of foreign affairs; Jean-Bernard Mérimé, former French representative at the UN Security Council; and Alain Lamassoure, member of the European Parliament.

There was a time when French was the language of diplomacy, and French diplomats were particularly active in developing their thinking on negotiation in the classical age. Remarkable practitioners, such as Hotman de Villiers, de Wicquefort, de Callières, Pecquet, Bonnot de Mably, and de Felice, have left a substantial legacy from the 17th and 18th centuries. From diplomacy “in spirit” to the “spirit of diplomacy.” A theory of balanced Mazarin-style diplomacy was now developed and fostered; negotiation was no longer the court of last resort before a war but a presage of peace. Moreover, to write about negotiation at that time was to pen a treatise on the most effective application of the intellect and the passions. From those early diplomatic seeds sprang a whole field of European public law.

Negotiation as we know it in the west was invented by the Greeks and Romans. The process was conducted in a manner that would ensure its effectiveness: over a banquet. The first modern European diplomats were the Papal Nuncios, the representatives of a Church that was vying for influence. Thereafter came the technicians and virtuosos of negotiation of 15th-century Italy.

It took a French Protestant, Hotman de Villiers, to codify the principles of diplomacy, which, in those days, was seen as a form of palace intrigue and involved the extensive use of corridors. This diplomacy borrowed its strategies from Florentine creativity and its openness to other cultures from Venetian shrewdness. It was subtle and abundant with its frequent pirouettes and secret correspondence, its intricate games and use of go-betweens. Later, it evolved into table diplomacy—and cocktail and “petit fours” diplomacy. Under such conditions, it is no surprise that Sir Henry Wotton, a late 16th-century English diplomat, described an ambassador as “an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.”

Richelieu, adviser to the king of France, then elaborated the concept of ongoing negotiation, a process defined as a way of effectively managing royal affairs. Negotiation took on a mainly preventive function and was designed to avoid the possibility of open conflict. Such a concept is quite a way from the earlier idea of negotiation as the art of weaving plots.
With de Felice, the pre-romantic historical context became highly influential. Men were moved by their passions; the point, therefore, was to discover what the other person’s passions were and to hide one’s own; then to make strategic use of one’s discoveries. De Callières made explicit the approach of shifting from a confrontational rationale to a “logic of complicity.” The point here was the subtle quest for consensus by cooling down the passions and cultivating cardinal diplomatic values such as patience. Form and substance completed each other, and rhetoric reinforced the intentions of the negotiator. Great European peace conferences such as those at Münster and Osnabruck, the masterly treaties of Westphalia, Nijmegen, Rijswijk, and Utrecht bear witness to strong borrowing from these principles.

From the French Revolution to the present day, the model has evolved considerably between two major historic milestones: the last legacy of the classical age, Talleyrand at the Vienna Congress, and the modern age with de Gaulle, the very opposite of the chameleon negotiator, reintroducing values, charisma and a sense of universality. The de Gaulle method relies on a long-term vision and aims to substitute state reason for state passion. The diplomat has to be rational and strategic. In the modern world, the capacity to negotiate expresses the independence of the country: “I negotiate, therefore I am.” Whenever possible, one has to start from a position of strength and compensate for a lack of power by a firmness of attitude.

Sincerity is not a handicap as it strengthens credibility. To negotiate over the conditions within which the negotiation will subsequently be carried out is the most important phase of the negotiation. The way one treats the other party is essential; one should not hurt the pride of a people, the dignity of its representatives. To honor the other is to honor oneself. Symbolic gestures also play also an important role, and must be used to enhance reality.

Workshop on Formal Models

A workshop for the PIN project, “Formal Models for International Negotiations,” was held from 14–15 June 2003 at IIASA. The project, in particular its origins and objectives, was described in a call for proposals in PINPoints issue 18/2002; earlier contributions to the subject were presented in several PINPoints (e.g., 16/2001).

Leen Hordijk, Director of IIASA, opened the workshop with a broad overview of the past and present scientific work of IIASA. This was followed by a presentation by the workshop organizers, Rudolf Avenhaus and I. William Zartman, of the concepts behind the workshop, as outlined in the earlier call for proposals and on the basis of their written introduction to the project which had been distributed to participants.

Ten invited speakers gave papers representing a broad international spectrum of expertise in the field. The papers may be grouped into three categories, as follows:

**Analyses of formal models in general**
- Rationality of Choice versus Rationality of Knowledge (Andrej Wierzbicki, Poland);
- Procedural Design for Conflict Resolution (Matthias Rait, Germany); and
- Bridging Games and Diplomacy (Michel Rudnianski, France).

**Analyses of formal models with applications**
- A Strategy-proof Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties (Steven J. Brams, USA, D. Marc Kilgour, Canada, and M. Renzi Sanver, Turkey);
- Using Formal Models for Addressing Practical Problems in Negotiations (Daniel Druckman, USA, and Serdar Güner, Turkey);
- Formal Models for Forecasting Outcomes of Negotiations of Interstate Conflicts (Rudolf Avenhaus and Thomas Krieger, Germany);
- The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a Tool for Negotiators (D. Marc Kilgour, Canada); and
- Recent Developments in International Relations (Barry O’Neill, USA).

**Formal models for concrete negotiations**
- International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game
- Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol (Akira Okada, Japan); and
- The IIASA Rains Model (Markus Amann, IIASA).

Following the presentations of papers by their authors, participants gave prepared statements; thereafter all participants made contributions to the better understanding and formulation of the papers.

To end the workshop, there was a general discussion, centering around questions such as, Were important topics omitted? and Lessons for theory and practice? The results of these discussions will be taken into account in the conclusions which will be made available in due course.

Full papers, completed or improved due to the workshop findings, are expected to be ready towards the end of 2003. Revisions and possible further contributions are expected to take a year. Thus, if all goes according to plan, a manuscript could be ready for publication at the end of 2004. A second workshop, to include a broader range of presentations, is planned for 12 June 2004, also in Laxenburg, and the book should appear in 2005; Springer Verlag has expressed interest.
Recently Published by PIN

How People Negotiate: Resolving Disputes in Different Cultures
Edited by Guy Olivier Faure

This book is a compilation of negotiation stories, presented with an integrative overview. The project was originally designed as a fishing expedition—throwing out nets, seeing what surfaced, then letting the catch speak for itself.

Some negotiation stories are strange and exotic, coming from China, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Guatemala, the Holy Land, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, the ancient Middle East, New Guinea, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey, and Zaire. Others are drawn from western settings such as France, Germany, and the United States but are not always too obviously concerned with negotiations. Some of these negotiations are exotic in their own right, such as negotiating with oneself, negotiating one’s own way through bicycle traffic, animals appearing to negotiate with each other, an observation framed as a negotiation with an armchair. The stories begin with Abraham negotiating with the Lord about the fate of Sodom, the first recorded account of negotiations known. These negotiations tell something new and unusual about negotiation. They are appealing, intriguing, exciting, intellectually challenging, and original. They shed light on new angles to negotiation. Finally, they tell something more about the world we live in and, indirectly, they also teach us about ourselves.

**Introduction**

**Part I: Negotiation: Definition and Scope**

1. Negotiating with an Artifact
   *Cécile Deman*
2. Do Horses Negotiate?
   *Françoise Burgaud*
3. Negotiation with the Self
   *Victor Kremenyuk*

**Part II: Problem Framing and Reference Points**

4. Abraham and the Lord
   *From The Bible*
5. Never Miss a Bargain
   *Nasir ed-Din Khodja*
6. The Perfect Switch
   *Jiwon Sushui*
7. The Beggar Needs a Better Life
   *Surya Sukanta*
8. Negotiating in the Deep Freeze
   *I. William Zartman*
9. Co-Payment of a Traffic Ticket
   *Honggang Yang*
10. Just a Small Thing
    *Daqian Wang*
11. Young Girl’s Wish
    *Amy Tan*

**Part III: Risk and Stress Management**

12. Cycling in Beijing
    *Guy Olivier Faure*
13. Rahab and the Spies
    *From The Bible, presented by Steven Brams*
14. Tushratta’s Requests to the Pharaohs
    *Senlar Güner and Daniel Druckman*

**Part IV: Escalation and Entrapment**

15. The Oyster and the Disputants
    *La Fontaine, translated by I. William Zartman*
16. A Question of Patience
    *Christine Sournia*
17. The Stupid Egg Seller
    *Xiangling Li*
18. On the Back of a Camel
    *Evangelos Papadopoulos*

**Part V: Deception, Tricks, and Stategems**

19. Mrs. Sweetness
    *Feng Menlong, presented by Ankhy Ia*
20. The Chinese Nephew
    *Author unknown*

**Part VI: Fairness**

21. The Password
    *Wang Xianghong*
22. Which Is My Half?
    *Nasir ed-Din Khodja*
23. The Faustian Bargain
    *Presented by Alexander Mehlmann*

**Part VII: Power Issues**

24. Selling and Buying Hahn in Korea
    *Sung Hee Kim*
25. Resisting the Uniform
    *Anne Faure Bouteiller*
26. Did You Pay the Ferryman?
    *Joanna R. Cameron*
27. Encountering the “Green Visitors”
    *Charles-Édouard de Suremain*

**Part VIII: Cultural Issues and Identity**

28. Restaurant Bargaining
    *Lambros Anagnostopoulos*
29. Personal Encounters Abroad
    *Francis Deng*
30. A Sexually Demanding Husband and a Domineering Mother-in-Law
    *M. Faour*

**Part IX: Third-Party Intervention and Mediation**

31. Peace Negotiation in the New Guinea Highlands
    *William L. Ury*
32. Nyabeda Tragedy
    *Mzee Javan Odenyo*
33. The Case of the Lost Tooth
    *Richard T. Antoun*
34. Negotiating within the Kinship Platform
    *Nze Ozichukwu Chakwui*

**Conclusion**
Knowledge Diplomacy in the Climate Talks: A New PIN Project

According to the Swedish diplomat, Bo Kjellen, who for many years has chaired large environmental conferences, as well as serving as chief environmental negotiator for both Sweden and the European Union, a new diplomacy has been particularly highlighted in the climate talks. New categories of actors have entered the game and old actors have taken on new roles. New negotiation strategies have been developed and the mix of background factors influencing the negotiations has been altered.

Many of these changes are associated with the increased importance of scientists, and ultimately of scientific knowledge, in international environmental negotiations. The climate talks are an extreme case in this regard. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) represents a new approach that has given the international scientific community a prominent role in multilateral negotiations. There is no doubt that the IPCC has functioned as a crucial driver in the negotiations that first produced the 1992 Framework Agreement on Climate Change and, five years later, led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The issue of climate warming—causes, effects, and countermeasures—is so complex that it needs to be framed and expressed in scientific language even when being considered in a political context. Thus, in all negotiations directly or indirectly concerning climate change, it has been necessary to establish a common understanding of the issues being negotiated. Scientific knowledge allows the nature of the problem of climate warming to be expressed, produces suitable countermeasures, and contributes to clarifying the risks related to causes, effects, and countermeasures.

Knowledge diplomacy is an important element of the new diplomacy that has emerged during the last decades. The agency/structure debate offers a traditional approach of bringing knowledge into the diplomatic game of the climate talks. Seen in this perspective, knowledge is part of the structure that constrains the choices and performance of the actors or negotiating parties. More specifically, knowledge is part of the power base underpinning the climate talks, and is associated both with individual negotiation strategies and the facilitation of the climate talks as a whole. Typically, actors (national governments, coalitions of states, international organizations) draw from the power base at their disposal in order to carry through a negotiation strategy or to defend their interests more generally. For example, effective leadership in the climate talks depends on the capacity to use relatively superior knowledge to frame proposals and argue for them at the table. Knowledge is likely to sustain almost any negotiation strategy one way or the other, but it is particularly effective for supporting approaches based on rational argumentation that explain what is “good for you and good for me.”

This perspective highlights the leadership problem not only in the climate talks but in other multinational negotiations on complex issues. In complex negotiations, leaders also need to have sanctioning power in order to discipline other parties and make them offer sacrifices in the exchange-of-concessions game. Sanctioning power, however, is obviously not a sufficient condition for leadership in the climate talks or in any other similar negotiations on highly complex issues. A leader in the climate talks has to be able to persuade other negotiating parties that a certain approach to coping with the climate problem is—or is not—effective and fair. If the effectiveness and fairness arguments cannot be accepted on rational grounds, then a negotiating strategy on the part of the hegemonic leader to encourage cooperation by other delegates has little chance of producing a sustainable agreement.

The agency/structure perspective on knowledge in the climate talks offers a number of approaches to supporting and facilitating these negotiations. For example, capacity building in order to support poor, developing (African) countries in pursuing their special interests would probably represent an important way of smoothing the progress of the climate talks.

This agency/structure perspective has important flaws, however. In some regards it is too simplistic. Process needs to be introduced into the analysis. The impact of knowledge on a negotiation and its outcome is determined by how it is handled during the process. In the pre-Kyoto negotiations, knowledge was processed in a way that was highly instrumental in the search for an agreement but which will probably not be repeated in the post-Kyoto negotiations.

The history of the negotiations on climate change distinguishes them from other multilateral talks such as, for example, the rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The GATT/WTO rounds were initiated by a leading power, the United States, which invited other countries to participate. Not unusually, coercive power was employed in the pre-negotiations, even if military power was irrelevant.

The climate talks had an entirely different character. A distinctive feature was the leading role of the international scientific community in the pre-negotiations. When climate change was put on the international agenda in the middle of the 1980s, this issue was fairly unknown, not only by policy makers but also in scientific circles. Therefore, issue clarification required exceptional measures, one of which was the institution of the IPCC, an organization for the generation and accumulation of scientific knowledge concerning climate warming. The climate issue, as we now understand it in the political discourse, was essentially constructed in the pre-Kyoto negotiations.

Using the IPCC as a principal instrument, the world scientific community took the initiative of identifying and framing the climate issue. This enterprise was continuously supervised, however, by national delegations. Although the international scientific community provided the basic knowledge/information, national delegations also actively participated in the construction of the climate issue. The climate issue was not delivered to them but was rather a result of their own doing in collaboration with the international scientific community. Hence, national delegations were themselves responsible for the construction of the climate issue, and this situation had far-reaching consequences. The agreement on the construction of the climate issue did not simply represent a widely accepted frame of reference. It also implicitly included a set of basic
A special and crucial feature of the pre-Kyoto talks on climate change was that joint interests and joint objectives were established before the parties took positions. This is different from the usual situation of a typical multinational negotiation where the main challenge is to construct joint interests on the basis of differing, separate interests. The difference between the two approaches is immense. Most, if not all, delegations were simply not able to discern their separate interests before the joint interests, nested in consensual issue knowledge, had been developed. It may be argued that the emerging consensual knowledge was a substitute for failing leadership in the climate talks on the Kyoto Protocol.

Since Kyoto the situation has changed in many ways. If the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol was a success, its implementation has been something of a failure. Thus, the current debate is particularly concerned with how the climate talks might become more effective. The argument is often heard that adequate knowledge is needed for the design of an effective climate regime. The negotiations are not served by more research. The main strategy should be to use existing knowledge in a creative way. This appears to be a rational approach if the climate talks are looked at through the agency/structure spectacles. The introduction of process into the analytical framework, however, leads to a different conclusion. It may seem rational to discontinue the production of new knowledge in the climate negotiation. The problem is, however, that this strategy eliminates a crucial driver in the regime-building process, making it necessary to develop new strategies for the knowledge diplomacy in the climate talks. This is the main reason why PIN has decided to begin a new book project concerning long-term facilitation of the international talks on climate change.

Gunnar Sjöstedt

### International Conference, “Universality of Negotiation,” To Be Held in Paris

An international conference on negotiation will be held in Paris from 11–12 December 2003. The conference is being organized by the French PIN group and NEGOCIA, a French business school belonging to the Paris Chamber of Commerce. The main topic will be Universality of Negotiation—Cutting across Domains, Disciplines, Approaches, Cultures, Conceptualization and Practice. The purpose of this conference is to create a synergy between different fields of negotiation (e.g., business, social, international, environmental) by examining a number of interrelated themes, such as conflicts and cooperation, cultures and identities, ethics and finalities, teaching, training and apprenticeship. The conference will provide an opportunity to seek out, as a group, a common base or eventual cross-references between various fields of negotiation.

An audience of 400 researchers and practitioners is expected. The language of the conference will be French, with simultaneous translation into English for most of the workshops. A publication in French and another in English comprising the most significant contributions on research and practice will follow.

Information can be obtained from the following Web site: www.negocia-evenementiel.com

Guy Olivier Faure

### Recently Published by PIN

**Professional Cultures in International Negotiation**

Edited by Gunnar Sjöstedt

**Part I: Introduction**

*Gunnar Sjöstedt, Guy Olivier Faure, and Winfried Lang*

**Part II: Case Studies**

Introduction: Negotiations of the Past

1. **Scientific Culture and Its Role in International Negotiations**—Klaus Gottstein
2. **Lawyer Culture: Negotiations on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court**—Gerhard Hafner
3. **Finland’s Membership Negotiations with the European Union**—Timo Kivimäki
4. **Uruguay Round Services Negotiations**—Anders Ahnlid
5. **Negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty**—Andreas J. Kumin
6. **Negotiations on the Convention to Combat Desertification**—Pamela Chasek

**Part III: Analysis**

Introduction: Perspectives on Professional Culture

7. A Qualitative Interview with Thirteen Practitioners—Nancy Caldwell
8. An Analytical Perspective from International Business Negotiations—Stephen E. Weiss
9. Conceptualizing Professional Culture and International Negotiations—Kevin Avruch
10. Negotiation Strategies across Industries—Catherine H. Tinsley and Jean A. Grube
From Peace to Justice

A Conference on the Role of International Law, Negotiations and International Development in Efforts to Establish Peace and Justice will be held from 25–27 March 2004 at The Hague in The Netherlands. There will be two plenary sessions in the Peace Palace, one on the afternoon of 25 March and one on the morning of 27 March. On 26 March, four parallel working sessions will be organized in four of the five institutions that are organizing the conference. The Dutch PIN Group will organize a full-day session, “Negotiating Peace and Justice,” chaired by I. William Zartman and Paul Meerts, hosted by the Clingendael Institute. Members of the PIN Network who are interested in participating in the Conference are kindly requested to contact Paul Meerts (pmeerts@clingendael.nl).

I. William Zartman

Remembering Talleyrand

The year 2004 marks the 250th anniversary of the birth of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand Périgord, a major figure in international negotiation. To celebrate his memory, a conference entitled, “Talleyrand, Prince of Negotiators?” will be held in Paris at the Business School of the Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (ESSEC) from 1–4 February 2004. Among the topics to be dealt with are the education of the diplomat, his main negotiations, such as his diplomatic mission to London, his negotiations with the Barbary States, with the Pope, and with the Concert of Powers at the Congress of Vienna. The specific methods used by Talleyrand to conduct his negotiations, the ethical issues raised by his practices, the role of women especially in the Congress of Vienna, and the legacy of Talleyrand and his school in contemporary conferences, will be presented and discussed. A play, a film, and a visit to Talleyrand’s residences in Paris will add a further dimension to the conference. The language of the conference will be French. All information concerning the conference organized by IRÉNÉ (ESSEC) can be obtained at www.irene-paris.com.

Guy Olivier Faure

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International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Telephone: +43 2236 807 267
Telefax: +43 2236 71313
E-mail: pin@iiasa.ac.at
Managing Editor: I. William Zartman
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